Your Boilerplate Objections are Garbage, and They Make You Look Dumb.

A Guide to Fighting The Menace of Boilerplate Objections

by Personal Injury Lawyer Noah Schwinghamer.

Table of Contents

What are Boilerplate Objections?

“Boilerplate” objections are stock, generalized responses to discovery that are repeated verbatim across multiple requests without regard to the actual content of the question. The term comes from the metal boilerplates that were mass produced and which contained multiple lines of fine print about the manufacturer.

These objections often include sweeping assertions like “vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”—often strung together in a single sentence without explanation. Courts uniformly condemn this practice because discovery objections must be specific and factually supported, not rote incantations. (See Korea Data Systems Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513.)

Boilerplate objections undermine the cooperative purpose of discovery. The Civil Discovery Act is designed to encourage transparency and the exchange of information necessary to prepare for trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Blanket objections, especially when used reflexively or without factual justification, obstruct that purpose and often signal bad faith.

How to Deal With Boilerplate Attorneys

Every litigator eventually encounters opposing counsel who reflexively serves pages of identical, non-responsive objections. The best approach is to stay professional, document everything, and build a clear record. Courts favor parties who demonstrate patience and good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes. (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

Before filing a motion to compel, send a detailed meet-and-confer letter identifying each objection, explaining why it is improper, and inviting a substantive response. Use the language of the Code—specificity, factual basis, proportionality—to demonstrate your reasonableness. If the other side refuses to amend, your correspondence will become valuable evidence that the objections were asserted in bad faith. And remember, the goal is not to punish but to obtain the discovery you are entitled to. Judges appreciate professionalism backed by a well-developed record.

Why Are Boilerplate Objections So Bad?

Boilerplate objections waste judicial resources, inflate litigation costs, and erode the integrity of the discovery process. They force unnecessary meet-and-confer efforts and motions to compel, consuming time that should be spent resolving the merits of the case. California courts have repeatedly criticized “generalized, unsupported” objections as a misuse of the discovery process under Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(e).

Worse, they deprive the requesting party of the ability to evaluate the claimed grounds for withholding information. An objection must allow the other side—and the court—to assess its legitimacy. When counsel simply parrots phrases like “privileged” or “unduly burdensome” without explanation, it becomes impossible to test those assertions. That is why courts increasingly impose sanctions for boilerplate discovery responses—they are not merely sloppy; they are obstructive.

How to Fight Specific Boilerplate Objections

The most effective way to neutralize boilerplate objections is to attack them one by one, demonstrating why each fails under California law. Cite the relevant case law and statutory language to show the precise limits of each objection. For example, “vague and ambiguous” requires that the responding party truly cannot understand the question; “burdensome” requires evidence quantifying the claimed hardship. It is amazing how many well educated attorneys, with degrees from prestigious schools hanging on their walls, lose the ability to understand basic English words when interrogatories are served.

In motion practice, emphasize that the burden of proof rests with the objecting party, and that good cause is not required to serve interrogatories. (See Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221) Unsupported objections are legally meaningless. Use the discovery statutes to your advantage—Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.240 mandates that any refusal to answer interrogatories be specific and justified. When opposing counsel cannot provide such justification, the court will typically overrule the objections and may impose sanctions for discovery abuse under CCP § 2023.010(e)-(f).

It is well established that the burden of proof is on the party making an objection to sustain its objection. (See e.g., Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12; West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422.)

Boilerplate objections have been condemned by appellate courts as “nuisance objections” and, even when involving important privileges, have necessitated monetary sanctions to compensate for the time wasted in eliminating them. See e.g., Standon v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898 (re impropriety of boilerplate “nuisance” objections); Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277 (re imposition of sanctions for “meritless” and “nitpicking” objections); Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc. (N.D.Ga 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40280 (“To the extent that Plaintiffs wish to compel Taser to omit boilerplate objections from its answers to interrogatories and requests to produce, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. Even a cursory review of Taser’s discovery responses in this case reveals that its answers to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are, almost without exception, qualified by boilerplate objections to the relevancy of the discovery sought, the undue burdens associated with its production, etc.”).

Some attorneys will begin their discovery responses with a “General Objection” that attempts to generally object to everything. There is nothing in the discovery act that authorizes this. In fact, the opposite is required.

Interrogatories – “If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response.

Requests for Production – “The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: […] An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” [CCP § 2031.21(a)(3).]

The standard of what is “relevant” to this action and “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is applied liberally. Typically, the resolution is in favor of allowing discovery. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790 n. 7-8.).

“A party may not deliberately misconstrue a question for the purpose of supplying an evasive answer.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783, citing Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp. (W.D.Mo. 1972) 56 F.R.D. 617.) “Indeed, where the question is somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.” (Id.)

Objections that a response is “vague and ambiguous” are themselves not sufficient grounds for denying the right of discovery in toto. (See Cembrook v. Sup. Ct. of San Francisco (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 423, 428.) The answering party owes a duty to respond in good faith as best he or she can. (See Deyo v. Kilourne (1978) 84 Cal. 3d. 771, 783.)

An objection of “unduly burdensome or harassing” can only be sustained if the objecting party can show that the asking party intended to create an unreasonable burden, or that burden created does not weigh equally with what requesting party is trying to obtain from it.

“Oppression must not be equated with burden [all discovery imposes some burden on the opposition] … to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing … that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 320-321, citing West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)

“The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at 417.) In the West Pico case, the court ordered discovery to proceed, over an objection of “burdensome and oppressive” supported by a declaration that responding to discovery would require a search of the records of 78 of its branch offices.

Interrogatories – This can be a valid objection, if the interrogatory is truly compound (attempts to squeeze two questions into one). [CCP § 2030.060(f).] However, if only part of an interrogatory is objectionable, the remainder must be answered. [CCP § 2030.240]. Misusing this objection, or worse, using it as an excuse to not answer a question entirely, is likely an abuse of discovery.

Requests for Production – There is no analogous code section for RPDs, so compound document requests are allowed.

The attorney work product doctrine (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030) is another area frequently abused through boilerplate objections. The doctrine absolutely protects an attorney’s “impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030(a); Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 494–495.)

However, it only conditionally protects all other work product, such as witness statements or factual summaries prepared in anticipation of litigation—protection that can be overcome by a showing of necessity, unfair prejudice, or injustice. (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 499–500.)

Documents created in the ordinary course of business or prior to any reasonable anticipation of litigation are not protected. (Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 120.)

Moreover, the doctrine does not justify withholding entire responses or refusing to produce factual material that exists independently of counsel’s analysis. A proper assertion must specify the nature of the material withheld and the grounds for protection, not simply parrot the words “attorney work product.”

Communication between an attorney and a client is generally privileged. (Evid. C. § 954.)

However, a blanket objection invoking “attorney–client privilege” is one of the most commonly—and most improperly—used discovery objections. Merely asserting the privilege is not enough; the objecting party bears the burden of establishing both the existence of the privilege and its proper application to each specific communication. (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733–734.) The privilege applies only to confidential communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of seeking or providing legal advice. (Evid. Code §§ 952, 954.)

The party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise, i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship. (D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 729; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 123.) Once that party establishes facts necessary to support a prima facie claim of privilege, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish the communication was not confidential or that the privilege does not for other reasons apply. (Evid. Code, § 917(a).)

General objections that all “communications” or “documents” are privileged are improper because they fail to identify what, specifically, is being withheld and on what grounds. California case law supports the solution of requiring the responding party to provide a privilege log or equivalent identification sufficient to allow the requesting party and the court to assess the claim. (See Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 130.) A rote objection that discovery “seeks information protected by attorney–client privilege” does not meet this burden and, when overused, often suggests either a lack of review or an attempt to conceal otherwise discoverable facts.

Importantly, the privilege protects communications, not underlying facts. A party cannot refuse to answer an interrogatory merely because the facts were conveyed to counsel. (State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 639.) Thus, a proper objection must distinguish between the protected communication and the factual substance, providing the latter while withholding only the privileged portion.

One particularly annoying boilerplate objection is a refusal to answer because the information or documents requested are “already within the possession of the requesting party.”

There is no legal basis for this objection. [CCP §§ 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230 and 2031.240.] A party cannot know which documents the other party does or does not have. The only time this would be a valid objection would be if the objecting party had already produced the requested document in discovery.

California’s Constitution provides an inalienable right to privacy. “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” (Cal. Const. Art. I, Section 1, emphasis added.)

Corporations are not “people” and therefore do not have a constitutional right to privacy in California. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755.)

Attorneys sometimes attempt to assert “privacy rights of third parties” in an attempt to not disclose witness information. This is inappropriate and impermissible. “‘The scope of discovery is very broad’ (Tien v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 535), and it includes the right to ‘obtain[] . . . the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter . . . .’ (§ 2017.010.)” (Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.)

On the other hand, defense attorney’s often attempt to overstep their bounds, and use discovery to obtain private medical records relating to medical care unrelated to the present lawsuit. This is also inappropriate and impermissible.

In the case of Board of Trustees vs. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525, the court stated that: “[S]ince judicial discovery orders [relating to private matters] inevitably involved state-compelled disclosure of presumptively protected information, the principles [of ART. I, Section I of the California Constitution] have equal application to purely private litigation.”

This right to privacy exists in one’s medical records, financial records, and other private personal records (Binder vs. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 901, Evid. C. § 994.)

There is a narrow exception to the rule that private records are not discoverable – when a plaintiff tenders a specific issue in litigation, she waives her privacy rights as to that particular issue. The “patient-litigant exception” holds that a plaintiff seeking to recover damages arising out of a particular injury cannot claim the physician-patient privilege with respect to that injury because plaintiff’s actions tender the issue. (Province v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1673, disproved on other grounds in Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 41.) 

However, unless the Plaintiff tenders a specific issue in litigation, it remains privileged. The fact that an opposing litigant raises a particular issue, has no bearing on his opponent’s privacy privileges. In Carlton v. Superior Court (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 282, plaintiff filed a personal injury action allegedly as the result of defendant operating an automobile while intoxicated. Defendant specifically denied being intoxicated. Thereafter, plaintiff sought discovery of defendant’s medical records in order to investigate whether or not defendant was intoxicated and to impeach the defendant. On appeal, the court ruled that even an in camera review of the defendant’s medical records was not permitted, as it would violate defendant’s right to privacy. (Id. at 293.) In summary, a party cannot “tender” into litigation their opponent’s confidential records. Only plaintiff can “tender” her body parts or medical issues into litigation. 

It is settled that, “plaintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864.) 

To compel discovery of a private matter, the court must be convinced that the information is directly relevant to a cause of action, i.e., that it is essential to determining the truth of the matters in dispute. (Britt vs. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862.) 

The scope of methods used must also be narrowly tailored to avoid disclosure of protected records. (Palay vs. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 934.) 

Finally, “the burden rests upon the party seeking the discovery to provide evidence from which the court may determine these conditions are met. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223, emphasis in original). 

In Hallendorf v. Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal. App. 35 553, 554-55, a defendant driver in an automobile collision sought discovery of information and records relating to medical problems other than those caused by the accident. The court held that defendant’s subpoenas were “clearly overbroad.” (Id. At 557.) 

Defendants in personal injury and employment actions sometimes attempt to invade a plaintiff’s private medical records in order to discover “other sources of general damages.”

The court in Mendez v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 557 pointed out the absurdity of this argument: “First and foremost, we have difficulty accepting the Defendants’ basic notion that Plaintiff’s claimed injury of severe emotional distress is somehow apportionable between preexisting anxieties and the mental trauma caused by the Defendants’ alleged conduct. We address here emotional distress distinctly related to particular conduct separate and apart from the turmoil created by life in general. Were we to accept Defendants’ proposition, arguably a Defendant might pry not only into the sexual affairs of the Plaintiff and her spouse, but into her financial affairs, her health (medical records) and the health of her spouse, children, parents and siblings. Problems in any of these areas might have caused preexisting emotional upset.” (Mendez v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 571, emphasis in original.)

Some attorneys apparently cannot be bothered to answer interrogatories, and try to evade giving substantive responses by simply referring the asking party something else. This is the lawyer equivalent of a customer service agent transferring your call rather than actually answering your question. This is not permitted.

“Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, ‘See my deposition,’ ‘See my pleading,’ or ‘See the financial statement.’ Indeed, if a question does require the responding party to make reference to a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be identified and summarized so the answer is fully responsive to the question. [citations omitted].” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771 783-784.)

IF responding to an interrogatory would require creating a “compilation, abstract, audit, or summary” of document(s) AND IF if “the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory” then CCP § 2030.230 allows a party to respond to an interrogatory by referencing this section.

If a party responds in this fashion, they must “specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained” AND do so with “sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” Finally they must produce these documents.

“A broad statement that the information is available from a mass of documents is insufficient. [citations omitted]” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771 784-785.)

Be warned however: “A party who makes recourse to this section declares that the information in the specified records is true, accurate, and complete, and that no other information is available to the answering party. (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 801, 805.)

Further, if a party responds in this fashion and references inadmissible documents, their opponent would have a good argument to the trial court judge that these formerly inadmissible documents should now be admissible as they have been deemed true, accurate, and complete.

Federal Rules

Rule 33(b)(4) requires that objections to interrogatories be made “with specificity” and provides that “[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”

Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires that objections to requests for production “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request.”

Rule 34(b)(2)(C) requires that “[a]n objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”

Getting Sanctions Against Attorney’s That Use Boilerplate Objections

The good news is that you can get sanctions against attorneys that persist in using boilerplate objections.

Under the Civil Discovery Act, discovery abuse is not only discouraged—it’s sanctionable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010(e)–(f).) Misuses of the discovery process include making unmeritorious objections and evasive responses that obstruct legitimate discovery efforts. When a party repeatedly asserts generic objections without factual or legal support, the court may impose monetary sanctions, and in egregious cases, issue or evidentiary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.)

California courts have consistently upheld sanctions in this context. In Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, the Court of Appeal affirmed monetary sanctions against counsel who repeatedly asserted boilerplate objections and refused to meaningfully engage in meet and confer efforts. The court emphasized that discovery must be conducted in good faith and that a party who obstructs that process by refusing to provide straightforward responses acts in bad faith and at their peril. (Id. at pp. 1294–1295.)

Boilerplate objections have been condemned by appellate courts as “nuisance objections” and, even when involving important privileges, have necessitated monetary sanctions to compensate for the time wasted in eliminating them. (See e.g., Standon v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898 (re impropriety of boilerplate “nuisance” objections); Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277 (re imposition of sanctions for “meritless” and “nitpicking” objections); Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc. (N.D.Ga 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40280 (“To the extent that Plaintiffs wish to compel Taser to omit boilerplate objections from its answers to interrogatories and requests to produce, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. Even a cursory review of Taser’s discovery responses in this case reveals that its answers to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are, almost without exception, qualified by boilerplate objections to the relevancy of the discovery sought, the undue burdens associated with its production, etc.”).)

In addition to being sanctionable, boilerplate objections can give rise to ethical violations and Jury Instructions for Willful Suppression of Evidence. Counsel must be careful not to assert objections to requests for production of documents that do not exist or are not in the attorney or party’s possession, custody or control. Such a response violates an attorney’s ethical duty under Bus & Prof Code §6068(d) to act truthfully and, therefore, constitutes bad faith. See Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 991.

Practically speaking, the best way to obtain sanctions is to build a clear record of the opposing party’s misconduct. Attach the boilerplate responses as exhibits, document your meet-and-confer efforts, and cite the discovery statutes requiring specificity and factual support. When the pattern is clear, the court will often view sanctions not as punitive, but as necessary to restore fairness to the process.

Boilerplate objections are not just lazy—they are a direct violation of the duty of candor and cooperation that governs California discovery. And when attorneys persist in using them, sanctions are not only justified—they’re overdue.